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Preface 
This paper is part of the ongoing evaluation of the reform in the Norwegian 
employment and welfare administration funded by the Norwegian Research Council. 
The paper is part of the sub-project in this evaluation named Welfare model, governance 
system and NAV (the Norwegian acronym for the employment and welfareadministration), headed 
by professor Tom Christensen. The paper has been presented at the ECPR Standing 
Group on regulatory Governance Biennial Conference on (Re)Regulation in the Wake 
of Neoliberalism. Consequences of Three Decades of Privatization and Market 
Liberalization, Utrecht, 5–6 June 2008. We want to thank Dag Runar Jacobsen, John 
Halligan and other participants at this workshop for comments.  
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Summary 
This paper aims to contribute to scholarly knowledge about public-sector mergers by 
analyzing a recent merger in the Norwegian welfare bureaucracy. The merger studied is 
one of the largest oriented reforms in recent Norwegian public administration history. 
The government decided in 2005 to merge the employment and national insurance 
services into a new entity called the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Service (NAV). We 
examine how instrumental problem-solving in the merger was conditioned by external 
forces, internal negotiations and cultural features by focusing on the first step in the 
implementation of the merger – the transition process that took place in 2005–2006. We 
examine the framing of the transition process, the activation of participants and 
agendas, and organizing the NAV at the central level. A main finding is that the scope 
for instrumental problem-solving is most of all conditioned by internal conflicts, to 
some extent by external control and to a lesser extent by cultural features.
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Sammendrag  
Siktemålet med dette paperet er å bidra til å øke kunnskapsgrunnlaget om 
sammenslåinger av offentlige organisasjoner ved å analysere NAV-reformen som er en 
av de største forvaltningsreformene i Norge. Regjeringen bestemte i 2005 å slå sammen 
A-etat og Rikstrygdeverket til en ny arbeids- og velferdsetat. Vi undersøker instrumentell 
problemløsning var betinget av ytre krefter, interne forhandlinger og kulturelle bindinger 
ved å fokusere på den første del av iverksettingsfasen fra 2005–2006. Vi studerer 
hvordan omstillingsprosessen ble rammet inn, aktivisering av deltakere og saksområder 
og på hvordan NAV ble organisert på sentralt plan. Et hovedfunn er at rommet for 
instrumentell problemløsning ble først og fremst begrenset av interne konflikter, men 
også til en viss grad av ytre kontroll. Kulturelle faktorer hadde også betydning men var 
mindre fremtredende. 
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Introduction 
Mergers are a frequent response to charges of inefficiency, ineffectiveness and 
unresponsiveness and therefore a popular organizational reform strategy in the public as 
well as in the private sector (Egeberg 2003, Hood et al. 1985, Pollitt 1984, Hult 1987). 
Nonetheless, scholars of public administration have shown less interest than their 
private-sector oriented colleagues in understanding the dynamics and effects of mergers 
(Hult 1987).1 More scholarly attention to public-sector mergers would presumably 
benefit public administration policymaking. Currently business strategists and executives 
benefit more than their government counterparts from scholarly insights into reasons 
why mergers run into difficulties or fail, and from their observations about the 
importance of paying attention to the cultural integration, competencies, management 
information systems and symbols in pre- and post-merger periods (Cartwright and 
Schoenberg 2006, Stahl et al. 2005). Experience gained from private-sector mergers 
cannot always easily be transferred to public-sector organizations because there are 
significant differences between organizations in the public and private sectors 
(Christensen et al. 2007).  
This paper aims to contribute to scholarly knowledge about public-sector mergers by 
analyzing a recent merger in the Norwegian welfare bureaucracy. The merger studied is 
one of the largest coordination-oriented reforms in recent Norwegian public 
administration history. Following years of debate and negotiation, the government 
decided in 2005 to merge the employment and national insurance services, both a 
century old, into a new entity called the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Service (NAV)2. 
The NAV was established in 2006 and employs 16,000 people, spends about one third 
of the state budget and serves practically all Norwegians through the provision of such 
things as unemployment benefit, rehabilitation allowance, pensions, child benefit and 
cash benefits. The aims of the reform were to create more jobs and to make the welfare 
service more user-friendly, more holistic and more efficient. The reform can on the one 
hand be seen as a ‘whole-of-government’ initiative intended to increase the capacity of 
government to address ‘wicked problems’ that cut across existing policy areas 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2007). On the other hand it can be seen as an arranged 
marriage between two formerly autonomous entities. As is usually the case in 
government, the merger was decided at ministerial level. In fact, one of the parties, the 
Employment Service, was against the merger while the other, the National Insurance 
Service, was in favour of it. 
In this paper we examine how instrumental problem-solving in the merger was 
conditioned by external forces, internal negotiations and cultural features such as 
administrative traditions. This will be done by studying the initial stage of the 
implementation process. It is well known from implementation studies that the 
                                                 
1 For an exception see John Halligans studies of Centrelink in Australia which was established as a one-stop shop 
multi purpose delivery agency by integrating a variety of social services (Halligan 2004, 2007). 
2 The reform also included a local partnership with locally based social services, in one-stop shops or local welfare 
offices, but we will not go into this part of the reform in any depth, simply alluding to it when necessary. 
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implementation process is often not a neutral, technical process but rather that the 
political process tends to extend into implementation (Winter 2003). A central issue in 
the analysis is how much leeway and discretion there was for an active and conscious 
implementation policy within the constraints imposed by above-mentioned internal and 
external factors.  
To answer this question, we focus on the first step in the implementation of the 
merger – the transition process that took place in 2005–2006. This stage in a merger 
tends to be largely overlooked by researchers (Hult 1987). Specifically, we focus on the 
events that led to the resolution of three key issues: first, how to frame the transition 
process; second, how to activate participants and agendas; and third, how to organize 
the NAV at the central level.3 After outlining the transition process, the paper treats it as 
an explanandum. Our theoretical point of departure is a transformative approach, 
focusing on the complex contexts in which political and administrative actors operate 
while trying to further reforms (Christensen and Lægreid, 2001).  
The empirical material utilized in the paper stems from an ongoing evaluation of the 
NAV reform commissioned by the Norwegian Research Council. The data were 
collected in the period November 2007–February 2008 from document studies and 
from semi-structured interviews with parliamentarians, past and present ministers, top 
civil servants in the ministries and in the NAV and interest group representatives, about 
50 individuals in all.  
Theoretical framework 
We do not believe in a one-factor explanation for the implementation of the merger and 
will distinguish between four perspectives to understand the implementation process. A 
hierarchical instrumental perspective sees the implementation process as a controlled design 
exercise characterized by instrumental problem-solving. It is assumed that the process is 
dominated by leaders and selected experts (March and Olsen 1983). Furthermore, the 
decision-making structure – the structure of participants – is assumed to be dominated 
by leaders in certain hierarchical positions, and the access structure – the problems and 
solutions on the agenda – is assumed to be dominated by definitions advocated by a few 
leaders in positions of authority. It is furthermore expected that political and 
administrative leaders in the mother ministry will control the framing of the 
implementation process and the structural model chosen for the NAV (March and 
Olsen 1976, Lægreid and Roness 1999).  
A negotiative, instrumental perspective sees an implementation process as a struggle 
between different actors, groups and organizations, reflecting heterogeneity in the public 
sector and in the environment (Cyert and March 1963). We pay special attention to 
internal conflicts between actors within the merged agency. It is assumed that the 
process is a tug-of-war over who should participate in decisions and how problems and 
solutions should be framed. In our case the crucial actors will presumably be the mother 
ministry, with its political and administrative leaders, the leaders of the two involved 
                                                 
3 Thus the paper does not focus on the process leading up to the decision in 2005 to bring about a merger (see 
Christensen 2008), nor on the merger’s effects on the stated goal parameters after 2006 (see Askim et al. 2008). 
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agencies, and possibly also the leaders of the Association of Local Authorities. We 
expect those involved to hold different views and for there to be conflicts and 
negotiations over the framing of the implementation process, the patterns of 
participants, the problems and solutions identified, and the way to structure the new 
agency. 
The third perspective used is a cultural one, which focuses on the administrative 
traditions of the merged agencies. Public organizations have histories and traditions that 
are manifested in informal norms and values. Due to path dependency, these norms and 
values have a bearing on reform processes and effects (Krasner 1988, Selznick 1957, 
Brunsson and Olsen 1993). One major challenge, seen from this perspective, is to find a 
way of perpetuating traditions while bringing about gradual change, something that 
often happens in reform processes. In extreme situations, the historical path is broken 
and a new one embarked on (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, Kingdon 1984), but most 
reforms try to modify certain aspects of historical traditions in a less dramatic way in 
order to fulfil the aims of the reform. According to this perspective, we would expect 
the framing of the implementation of the NAV reform to be influenced by traditions in 
the civil service and for cultural trajectories to play a role in activating participants, 
identifying problems and finding solutions. We would also expect the new structure to 
retain elements from the old structures of the two merging agencies.  
A fourth perspective focuses on environmental features. The environment can be 
divided into types: technical and institutional (Meyer and Rowan 1977, Scott 2003). 
Both types may further and hinder reforms in public organizations and exert control 
over the implementation process. The technical environment may direct attention 
towards certain problems and pressures, such as the need to lower unemployment and 
to make the existing apparatus for employment and welfare more effective and efficient. 
The institutional environment is related to myths and symbols about how public 
administrations should be organized (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). We will analyse what 
relevance the environment has for the implementation process. We focus on the merged 
agency, the NAV, while the mother ministry will be treated as an external control body 
in the NAV’s technical environment. We ask: Is there pressure from the technical 
environment that results in the process being framed in a particular way, in certain 
patterns of participation, in a focus on certain problems and solutions, or in a certain 
new agency structure being chosen? We also discuss what influence the institutional 
environment has on these matters.  
In discussing the merger we apply a compound transformative approach 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2001, 2007). This means that we regard the four theoretical 
perspectives as complementary rather than mutually exclusive. We see the merger as a 
complex interaction between different factors: we examine how a consciously designed 
reform is transformed in the course of the implementation process as it encounters 
cultural constraints, internal interests and external pressures. 
WORKING PAPER  11  –  2008 IMPLEMENTATION OF  MERGER 
10 
Implementing the merger in the Norwegian 
welfare bureaucracy 
We focus in our case description on three events that took place between the Storting’s 
decision in June 2005 to merge the formerly autonomous welfare services and the 
establishment of the NAV in July 2006. This year-long transition process is of practical 
importance because this initial implementation stage produced decisions that 
presumably will strongly influence the NAV’s ability to achieve its objectives. Within the 
transition process we focus our attention on the events leading to the resolution of three 
key issues: first, how to frame the transition process; second, how to activate 
participants and issue agendas; and third, how to organize the NAV at the central level, 
including defining the interface between strategy and delivery. We will also argue that 
the framing and activation will influence the organization of the central agency. 
Backg round   
To help understand the progression and outcomes of these events, we begin the case 
description by providing some information about the parts of the reform process that 
preceded the implementation stage and about the organizational entities that were 
merged as a result of the reform – the Employment Service and the National Insurance 
Service. 
Initial stages of the reform process 
The process leading to the Storting’s decision in May 2005 to radically reform the welfare 
bureaucracy started three-and-a-half years years earlier, in December 2001, when the 
Storting instructed the minority Bondevik II government to give a report on how the 
welfare bureaucracy could be merged. At the time, responsibility for running welfare 
services was divided among the Employment Service, the National Insurance Service 
and local governments that provided social services. We should note that there was a 
widely shared view among the parliamentarians that the hitherto autonomous entities 
had failed to deliver upon repeated requests for improved inter-service coordination 
(Christensen 2008). In response, the government proposed on the basis of a report by 
an inter-ministerial working group that the welfare bureaucracy should continue as three 
autonomous entities with responsibility for pensions, employment and social services. 
The running of employment and social services would be brought together in local one-
stop shops (St. meld. no 14., 2002–2003).  
The government was heavily criticized for this proposal, since it failed to respond to 
the Storting’s request for a merger of the three services. The Storting therefore returned 
the proposal to the government and instructed it to come back to the Storting with 
suggestions for a merged welfare service. The government was thus compelled to start 
planning afresh. It therefore established an external public commission, consisting 
primarily of academic policy experts whose mandate was to discuss coordination and 
merger. However, the proposal the commission came up with turned out to be pretty 
similar to the rejected proposal (NOU 2004:13); it stated that there should be one 
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autonomous service for income and employment, one for pensions and rights and one 
for social services, and that the last should remain a local government responsibility.  
By the time the expert report was delivered, a new ministry had been established 
owing to a ministerial reshuffling. For the first time responsibility for national insurance 
and employment was integrated in one ministry. The laws regulating the administration 
of social services by local government also became part of this new super-ministry’s 
portfolio. Merging political responsibility paved the way for a coordinated effort by the 
ministry to implement the reform.  
Being a minority government, the government was disinclined to present the self-
assured Storting with a proposal that was almost identical to the rejected one. It therefore 
proposed a partial merger. Responsibility for employment and national insurance 
services would be given to a new entity led by a central government agency, while social 
services would remain a local government responsibility. Municipalities would be 
obliged by law, however, to run certain social services in partnerships with the merged 
employment and national insurance services in the form of one-stop shops (St.prp. no. 
46 2004–2005)4. This proposal was accepted by the Storting, even though it meant a 
partial rather than a full merger of the welfare bureaucracy.  
The employment and welfare services before the reform 
The Employment Service was established in 1916 and was led by the Directorate of 
Labour (DOL), a central agency. Before the reform, the Employment Service had 
around 3,800 full-time positions and was represented at all three levels of government – 
at the central level through the DOL, at the county level through its 18 county offices 
and at the local level through its 162 local offices. The Employment Service held 
responsibility for the implementation of labour market policy. Its main task was to help 
people find new jobs as quickly as possible, by carrying out an active job search, by 
providing clients with personal advice and by helping them gain qualifications. The 
service’s tasks also included researching the labour market, providing economic benefits 
and monitoring.  
A combination of factors meant that the Employment Service, and the DOL in 
particular, embarked on the implementation of the NAV reform with a strong 
determination to leave their mark on the organizational structure and policy orientation 
of the merged entity. Since labour policies tend to shift with macroeconomic conditions 
and shifts in government, the DOL was well accustomed to adapting – and at times 
strategically defending – the service’s dimensions, programmes and policies in response 
to external pressure. Furthermore, the service had gone through a series of reforms 
during the previous decade, the most radical of which had ended the service’s monopoly 
on job and personnel provision and allowed private companies access to the market for 
such services. The reforms also involved service diversification, modernization of 
information technology and changes in top DOL personnel. As a result of this string of 
reforms, DOL executives had become very aware of the relationship between 
organizational reform, human resources, priorities and services. The combination of 
                                                 
4 Municipalities were required, as a minimum solution, to offer some of their economically oriented social services 
under the umbrella of the local partnership offices (Fimreite and Lægreid 2008, Fimreite 2008). 
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external pressures and reform experience had made the DOL highly conscious of and 
loyal to the service’s mission – getting people into employment. Third, DOL executives 
saw the NAV reform as a threat to the Employment Service and its mission. They 
feared that a merger would leave them unable to defend the Employment Service’s 
mission against the far larger National Insurance Service, with its plethora of tasks and 
objectives and, not least, its rhetorically powerful Rechtsstaat principles. As one 
respondent from the DOL said: 
«I had learned that if there is a debate in the public domain between work and 
rights, rights always win» (civil servant, interview 2007) 
 Finally, the Employment Service embarked on the merger implementation with a sense 
of having lost an unwanted and demanding reform preparation race at the finishing line, 
and it saw the 2005–2006 transition stage as an opportunity to make a late comeback. 
The Storting’s placing of the merger issue on the public policy agenda in 2001 was 
perceived by DOL executives as tantamount to authorizing the National Insurance 
Service to stage a hostile takeover. Hence, throughout the 2001–2005 reform 
preparation phase the DOL lobbied first the ministerial working group and then the 
external expert commission and was initially relieved to see that both advised the 
government to maintain separate services for employment and pensions. However, 
come 2005 and the finishing line, the DOL bitterly observed that a new minister, Mr 
Dagfinn Høybråten, a former director of the National Insurance Service, had rejected 
the expert commission’s recommendations and advised the Storting to go through with a 
merger. 
The National Insurance Service was also an old institution, established in 1895. It 
had about 7,600 full-time positions when the reform started, and it was represented in 
every county and municipality in Norway. Close to 2 million persons received regular 
benefits from the National Insurance Service. The service was led by the central agency, 
the National Insurance Administration (NIA), and its operation was mainly regulated by 
the National Insurance Act, which had three main goals: to provide economic security 
via a guaranteed income; to compensate citizens for expenses related to unemployment, 
pregnancy, maternity, single parenthood, illness and injury, disability, old age and death; 
and to help people cope on a daily basis. 
The NIA did not embark on the implementation of the NAV reform with the same 
sense of determination and preparation for battle as the DOL. Some feared that a 
merger could be used as an opportunity to introduce IT solutions that would take the 
provision of benefit services away from the local welfare offices, and that this would 
also worsen services to older and not very computer-literate clients. Most NIA 
executives and NIA staff, however, saw the merger as an opportunity rather than a 
threat. The NIA’s service portfolio was broader than the Employment Service’s; the 
NIA in fact administered several employment-related services, and its staff had over 
time become increasingly aware that the structural division between the two services 
hindered them in offering customized service packages to clients. This complexity in 
types of services and clients meant, moreover, that the NIA lacked the DOL’s 
dedication to a single mission. Furthermore, unlike the Employment Service, the NIA 
had not been subject to recent reforms of its organizational structure and IT systems, 
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and NIA executives had not had to adapt to societal mood swings and political whims. 
National insurance policies tend to be stable across changes in governments and 
macroeconomic conditions. Finally, the NIA did not enter the transition phase in fight-
back mode; NIA executives rightly felt that they had won the 2001–2005 reform 
preparation process. They had been in favour of merger from the start and were relieved 
when their former director turned the tables in 2005.  
F r am ing  t he  t r an s i t i on  p r o ce s s  
Once the Storting had accepted the reform proposal in May 2005, the government faced 
the task of preparing a reform that would involve considerable new legislation and one 
of the largest organizational mergers ever conducted in the Norwegian public sector, 
while at the same time maintaining normal levels of service from the soon-to-cease 
national insurance and employment services. We proceed by showing how choosing an 
organizational form for the transition process and recruiting a leader for it constituted 
strategic framing decisions that affected the dynamics and outcomes of the year-long 
transition process.  
The organizational form 
The choice of organizational form for the transition was made by the Ministry of 
Labour and Social Affairs. Key decision-makers there included the minister and former 
NIS director, Mr Høybråten, and Lars Wilhelmsen, a seasoned ministerial official and 
former DOL director. Mr Wilhelmsen was asked to organize a transition plan, to 
supervise the ministry’s control over the transition, and to lead the ministry’s 
preparation of the legislative amendments necessary for the establishment of the NAV, 
the so called NAV Act (Ot.prp. nr 47).  
The decision the ministry reached was to establish a temporary agency with 
directorate status – an organizational innovation in the Norwegian public sector. NAV 
Interim, as the agency was called, would operate in parallel with the national insurance 
and employment services from June 2005 until the NAV took over their tasks in July 
2006 (Ot. prp, nr. 96 (2005–2005)). In other words, while NAV Interim was planning 
for their succession one year down the road, the two existing welfare agencies were to 
go about their business as usual. NAV Interim’s tasks included merging the national 
insurance and employment services at central, regional and local level, and establishing 
the local NAV offices in partnership with local governments. NAV Interim was given 
authority over the affected agencies on merger-related issues and was to report to the 
Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.5 The Ministry was to be consulted on key 
organizational issues. Important ex-ante guidelines for NAV Interim’s work were 
formulated in the ministry’s proposal to the Storting (St. prp .no. 46 (2004–2005)), in 
NAV Interim’s approbation document and, not least, in a so-called Overall Plan for 
implementing the reform from 2005 to 2009 developed jointly by the NIA, the DOL 
and NAV Interim (NAV Interim 2005). In addition, the frequency of meetings and 
                                                 
5 The Ministry was reorganized and changed its name later in the fall of 2005 to the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Inclusion. 
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correspondence between NAV Interim and the ministry was generally high, at times 
taking place daily.  
One radically different alternative organizational format for the transition would have 
been to establish the NAV directly and close down the two existing agencies 
immediately after the Storting had accepted the reform proposal on May 31 2005. This 
alternative was discarded primarily for instrumental reasons. There was a widely shared 
view that it would unacceptably disrupt the running of the affected welfare services – 
services that were important, in many cases vital, to hundreds of thousands of clients. 
And conversely, it was assumed that the merger preparation would not get enough 
attention if it took place in parallel with the day-to-day running of services. Policy 
learning was also involved. The ministry commissioned a report from Statskonsult, a 
state-owned consultancy, on lessons to be learned from three recent mergers in the 
Norwegian public sector – mergers that resulted in the establishment of the Norwegian 
Agricultural Authority in 2000, the Directorate for Health and Social Affairs in 2002 and 
the Norwegian Food Safety Authority in 2004 (Statskonsult 2005). The report strongly 
advised NAV reformers to emulate these three mergers’ common strategy of starting 
the merger implementation with an interim process, i.e. a transition between deciding on 
and implementing the merger. Furthermore, there was a culture-related reason behind 
the choice of format. The two existing agencies and their leaders were perceived to need 
some time to interact, to get to know each other and to get used to the idea that their 
century-old agencies – undoubtedly infused with value, to use Selznick’s (1957) 
terminology – would be terminated. The idea of a merger «needed to mature», as several 
respondents put it.  
A second alternative, closer to the chosen format, would have been to conduct the 
transition within the ministry. This alternative was discarded for several reasons. An 
instrumental reason was that the ministry would be hard put to mobilize the capability 
and capacity necessary to take on the task of preparing a gigantic and controversial 
merger. And conversely, the merger’s magnitude and high profile meant that its 
preparation would probably steal attention from other pressing issues on the ministry’s 
agenda. A negotiation-related reason why the transition was not located within the 
ministry was that the two existing agencies were assumed to need a «boxing ring». 
Before the NAV could become stable and peaceful enough to be able to be trusted with 
running employment and national insurance services, the existing agencies and their 
leaders would need an arena where they could settle their differences – differences that 
had been accentuated and reinforced during the 2001–2005 reform preparation process. 
A ministerial project would make an unsuitable and inappropriate venue for this 
potentially challenging exercise. Some respondents viewed NAV Interim’s boxing ring 
function as a problem, but most saw it as valuable:  
«[NAV Interim] was on a personal level and more generally an exercise between 
the NIA and the DOL…for things to calm down and settle» (civil servant, 
interview). 
«There are values, positions etcetera to defend in such a setting, so it was 
obviously a fortunate side-effect of NAV Interim that many such things could be 
played out in a slightly closed arena … and maybe settled there» (civil servant, 
interview). 
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«There was a lot of positioning going on [between the DOL and the NIA]. That 
was maybe OK because it meant that a good deal of the power play was over and 
done with before we became the NAV» (civil servant, interview) 
We should note that the need for a boxing ring made a third alternative organizational 
format – outsourcing the transition to an external milieu – equally unattractive.  
Finally, there was a symbolic reason to locate the transition in a temporary agency 
outside the ministry. The agency format signals distance from politics and a strong 
emphasis on neutral expertise. In reality, though, the format places few legal constraints 
on a ministry’s steering ambitions, since agencies, even after some NPM efforts, have 
their autonomy limited by the ministerial responsibility principle, which also 
encompasses some of their activities. Choosing an agency format therefore suited the 
ministry’s political leaders well. It allowed them to signal that implementation of the 
reform was driven by professional experts, and therefore potentially made them 
‘immune’ to criticism, while at the same time they maintained considerable control over 
NAV Interim’s activity.  
Recruiting a leader 
Based on experiences from previous mergers, Statskonsult (2005) advised the ministry 
to appoint a leader for NAV Interim as early as possible, to ensure progress, and to 
make this appointment valid for NAV as well as for NAV Interim, to ensure continuity. 
The ministry duly decided that the person recruited to head NAV Interim would also 
head the NAV. Statskonsult’s report offered little advice on what qualifications to look 
for in a leader, however. The ministry decided that the leader would be neither of the 
two directors of the national insurance and employment services; they would instead be 
appointed assistant directors. The person the ministry recruited to head NAV Interim 
was Tor Saglie, an experienced civil servant whose former positions included secretary 
general in the Ministry of Local Government, director of the University of Oslo and 
assistant director of Oslo municipality. He lacked experience in the two welfare services 
concerned, however, and was perceived by most affected parties, including politicians 
and agency and ministry officials, as «a local government man». Recruitment below 
deputy director level was delegated to the DOL, the NIA and Mr Saglie.  
Choosing Mr Saglie was not controversial, given his experience and reputation. 
Nonetheless, an obvious alternative to the recruitment of Mr Saglie would have been to 
recruit the NAV’s director from one of the two existing welfare agencies, preferably one 
of the two incumbent directors. Both would have been more familiar with the involved 
sector policies and personnel than the «local government man» was. Several reasons 
spoke in favour of a fresh face, though.6 A negotiation perspective highlights two: The 
ministry feared that if left to fight it out among themselves, the two existing welfare 
agencies would spend more energy on arguing about how to staff the top NAV 
positions than on planning a new, improved, merged agency. Furthermore, both the 
existing welfare agencies intensely feared domination by the other. Appointing NAV 
Interim’s leader from one of the two would have been perceived across the welfare 
                                                 
6 The directors of the two former agencies quit rather soon after NAV was established. 
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bureaucracy as ministerial authorization for that person to dictate the NAV’s shape and 
form. In effect, NAV Interim’s decisions would have lost legitimacy and been hard to 
implement. 
 «There was a crazed fear that the DOL or the NIA would gain too much 
influence over the work [of NAV Interim], so they kind of took [the transition 
process] away from us» (civil servant, interview). 
A symbolic perspective highlights a further reason for the appointment of Mr Saglie: It 
was important for the government to communicate to stakeholders outside the two 
welfare agencies, above all to the Storting and the local government sector, its intent to 
make the NAV a fresh start for the welfare bureaucracy, not a continuation of old ways 
under a new name.  
«We chose a local government man as leader … to ensure that [NAV Interim] had 
legitimacy in the amalgamation phase … to signal that this is a fresh start, it is not 
one agency taking over the other» (politician, interview). 
I n f l u enc i ng  p a r t i c i p a t i on  and  i s sue  agendas  
Statskonsult (2005) concluded in its study of former mergers that the composition and 
number of people involved are critical success factors for an interim organization’s 
ability to complete its tasks. Hence, the formal reform leaders, Mr Wilhelmsen in the 
ministry and Mr Saglie as the director of NAV Interim, would presumably have to keep 
tight control on participation to be able to steer NAV Interim in their preferred 
direction. 
Influencing participation 
According to our respondents, the reform leaders in fact exercised limited control over 
participation. NAV Interim’s size swelled beyond what they foresaw, and it was only a 
matter of weeks before new and larger offices had to be found. 
 «[NAV Interim] started with ten people, with Saglie at the helm, and then simply 
grew during the winter. … people stumbled in from the agencies, and in the end 
we were a couple of hundred» (civil servant, interview).  
Furthermore, and unlike the mergers reviewed by Statskonsult, the welfare agencies 
conceded little control over who they released to NAV Interim. This illustrates a 
negotiation aspect of the transition. For one thing, unlike in former mergers, where 
incumbent directors participated only in steering and working groups, both agencies 
released their directors. Furthermore, there were differences between the two agencies. 
DOL leaders, who saw the reform as a threat and were intent on ‘revenge’, recognized 
NAV Interim as the window of opportunity it was, and released most of their 
recognized strategists, i.e. most of their top executives. Former DOL and NIA officials 
agree fully that the DOL was more strategic than the NIA in its appointments to NAV 
Interim. 
 «The DOL was far more strategic about who it brought into NAV Interim than 
the NIA was» (former NIA official, interview). 
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 «It was the cream that went [to NAV Interim]. The rest … were left to… clear 
the desk» (former DOL official, interview). 
Influencing the agenda 
The formal reform leaders’ limited control over participation also limited their control 
over NAV Interim’s issue agenda, since participants brought their own agendas, 
problems and solutions. The reform’s partially conflicting goals – more jobs and a more 
user-friendly, holistic and efficient service – also gave participants leeway. For example, 
some participants advocated certain solutions, citing user friendliness, whereas others 
favoured other, incompatible solutions in the name of efficiency. To some extent 
participants brought personal agendas with them, and the magnitude of the 
organization, the vast number of problems to be addressed and the limited time 
available meant that Mr Saglie could not oversee, much less control, everything that 
went on at NAV Interim. 
«Issues …just ignited … I think opportunities emerged for action because things 
went a bit too fast» (civil servant, interview). 
 «It was pretty chaotic … what people worked with and what they emphasized 
was largely person dependent» (civil servant, interview). 
Though some personal agendas were involved, to a large extent agency representatives 
brought agency agendas with them. And again, it is widely recognized that the DOL 
came into NAV Interim with clearer ideas than the NIA did.  
«[The NIA] naïvely thought that one would actually create something in 
cooperation; that one would start anew to create a new agency. But as it were, [the 
DOL] had its wishes and plans set beforehand…[the NIA] was less aware of the 
political game, something the DOL was far more skilled at» (former NIA official, 
interview). 
«[The DOL] had not forgotten its preference for separate agencies for 
employment and pensions …Naïvely or not, …[the NIA] thought it appropriate 
to enter [NAV Interim] with an open mind. Here we will create something new ... 
together with the other agency» (former NIA official, interview). 
«The employment side had worked a lot on how [the NAV] should be … while 
the NIA did not have one single thought. They just waded into NAV Interim» 
(former DOL official, interview). 
In addition to these widely recognized negotiation aspects, there was agreement on both 
sides of the agency divide that NAV Interim was dependent on key DOL strategists to 
complete its tasks on time. As mentioned above, the Employment Service – unlike NIS 
– had accumulated a decade of reform experience. It was seen as imperative for NAV 
Interim to mobilize the people involved in these reforms. 
Representatives from The Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities 
(KS) were also invited to participate in the implementation process. Their inclusion had 
several rationales. Instrumentally, including KS broadened the issue agenda and 
perspectives on problems beyond those initially held by the welfare agencies. For 
example, KS brought its perspectives on how to construct the local partnership model 
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between the state and the municipalities (Fimreite 2008). There were negotiation-related 
reasons for KS’s inclusion too. It was believed that the inclusion of a neutral third party 
could broker the DOL-NIA conflict. Furthermore, there were cultural reasons. Mr 
Saglie and Mr Wilhelmsen, who both knew the local government sector well7, worked in 
NAV Interim and the ministry, respectively, to reduce state officials’ scepticism towards 
ceding responsibility to local government (Fimreite 2008). Finally, including KS 
representatives also had symbolic significance. NAV knew it relied on legitimacy in the 
local government sector to be able to establish the local partnerships, and working out 
the details of the partnership model without including KS would reduce its acceptance. 
Moreover, several local government-oriented parliamentarians had a strong stake in the 
initiation and establishment of NAV, and it was well known that they kept themselves 
informed about the internal workings of NAV Interim. 
Organ i z i ng  t he  NAV  a t  t he  c en t r a l  l e ve l  
NAV Interim organized its activities in five programs, one of which was called New 
Service. One of the projects established under this program was to propose an 
organizational structure for the central-level NAV, i.e. the parts of the NAV that would 
hold overall, as opposed to functional or geographically delimited, responsibilities. This 
process took place over a period of four weeks in November–December 2005. The 
project’s mandate was fairly loose, although the above-mentioned Overall Plan (NAV 
Interim 2005), developed jointly by the two welfare agencies and NAV Interim, 
provided some guidance. An external consultant was appointed project leader, and the 
agencies nominated eight further project members. Three models were proposed, each 
model emphasizing a different specialization principle. After a rapid sounding-out 
exercise, where the proposals were presented and discussed with agency executives, the 
unions and the 400-plus agency staff, a unanimous recommendation was issued for a 
fourth compromise model. To prevent union demands for time-consuming negotiations 
over the new structure, NAV Interim had the ministry obtain a government resolution 
on the suggested model. This resolution was passed in December 2005, and from 
January 2006 NAV Interim could establish new projects to elaborate the organizational 
structure of the NAV at the central level, based on detailed mandates and premises laid 
down by the overall model. Two key sub-events are focused on here, namely the 
process of deciding how to organize the agency and the process of deciding how to 
organize the interface between strategic and operational functions. 
Organizing the agency  
The organization model for the agency that was eventually arrived at was a hybrid 
between process and purpose specialization (Christensen et al. 2007). Below the 
director, Mr Saglie, five assistant directors were appointed. These were assigned 
responsibility for (i) county entities and local NAV offices, (ii) specialized units, (iii) the 
semi-outsourced entity responsible for operative functions – the NDU, (iv) employment 
policy, and (v) pensions policy. Instrumentally, this appears to be a challenging 
                                                 
7 Mr Wilhelmsen spent a decade at the Ministry of Local Government 
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organizational model. First, the division of the merged agency’s responsibility for 
policymaking between two directors along the pre-reform employment-pensions 
boundary is not without its problems. Second, the interface between NAV offices and 
specialized back-offices is a critical success factor for the NAV. It is therefore rather 
surprising that the NAV’s steering of NAV offices and specialized units is divided 
between two directors. Finally, it is also puzzling that NDU should be represented on 
the Agency’s board of directors. 
The outcome of the structuring process can best be explained as the result of 
negotiations between the DOL and the NIA. The DOL embarked on NAV Interim 
with three overall objectives, all rooted in objectives it pursued in the reform 
preparation process. One was to obtain a separate director’s post for employment 
policy, so as to ring-fence the NAV’s focus on employment. The DOL representatives’ 
eagerness to separate employment policy from pensions policy was reinforced by their 
realization that the NAV would be given the task of continuing the NIA’s 
implementation of a demanding pensions reform until 2010. A second DOL objective 
was to make the primary task of NAV offices activation and employment services, 
rather than case-processing of pensions claims. The DOL thought the latter should be 
handled in larger, specialized units. While the reform was being prepared the DOL’s 
preference was to establish a separate pensions agency. When this proved impossible, its 
second option was to create a separate NAV director’s post for specialized back-office 
tasks and pensions. A third DOL objective was to keep a tight rein at the county level. 
Experience gained from the Employment service suggested that this was the best way to 
ensure that national policy would be implemented to the letter at the county level, and 
that this could be accomplished by appointing a separate director for the counties. The 
DOL fought consistently for these objectives throughout the 2005–2006 transition 
process and did not encounter much resistance either from the NIA or from the 
ministry.8 Central actors in NAV Interim, furthermore, perceived it as inappropriate for 
the ministry to interfere in their planning of the NAV’s central organizational structure. 
«The ministry tried [to interfere] but then we drew the line. They had no insight 
into [organization], and did not have the necessary qualifications to discuss and 
hold opinions» (civil servant, interview). 
«It is the agency’s task to organize itself, it’s as simple as that» (civil servant, 
interview). 
A bi-product of the division of policy areas was that NAV’s pension policy group 
became staffed almost exclusively with former NIA staff, and the employment policy 
group primarily with former DOL staff. Moreover, when the pension reform is 
implemented in 2010, the pensions policy group will be practically deprived of tasks. 
Organizing the interface between strategic and operational functions 
It was eventually decided that the interface between strategic and operational functions 
would consist of two separate entities. The NAV Agency – the Directorate – would 
                                                 
8 As described by Fimreite (2008), ministerial interference was far stronger on organizational issues that touched on 
the central-local dimension, such as deciding the interface between local and regional NAV offices. 
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employ about one third of the 1,000-plus people hitherto employed by the central-level 
DOL and NIA. A separate entity called NAV Service and Development (NDU) would 
employ the remaining two thirds. NDU would be organized according to the process 
principle (Christensen et al. 2007) and run NAV’s procurement, accounting, human 
resource management, legal advice service and IT systems. The NDU and the NAV 
would share responsibility for policy development. The relationship between the agency 
and the NDU would be a purchaser-provider one, but their inter-organizational ties 
would remain fairly tight. The NDU would provide services exclusively to the NAV and 
would be fully funded by the NAV through block and project-related funding, and 
NDU’s director would sit on the directorate’s board of directors.  
Several instrumental factors explain this outcome. Sheer size, for one. NAV Interim’s 
leaders feared that unless they placed some central functions outside the directorate, it 
would become a gigantic and unmanageable organization. Policy learning from the 
welfare services was also involved. The DOL and the NIA had both struggled to 
separate strategic and operational functions, and both had come to see this as an 
impediment to long-term strategic planning. The merger was therefore seen by both 
sides as a window of opportunity to construct an overdue structural split between 
strategic and operational functions.  
«Service-related issues can take up a lot of management attention – attention that 
should be directed towards producing results and developing an organization... 
Both the NIA and the DOL had experienced that day-to-day directorate work was 
impeded because ... daily [operational] crises kept arising and stealing energy» (civil 
servant, interview). 
«These directorates had not been especially good in the old days ... none of them 
were any good at strategy... We thought that maybe it was possible [through a 
split] to raise the directorate function to a somewhat higher level» (civil servant, 
interview). 
The specific purchaser-provider model chosen for the split emerged as a result of policy 
transfer from organizations outside the welfare bureaucracy. An external consultant 
recommended introducing the model, based on experiences from Telenor, 
Rikshospitalet University Hospital and the Norwegian Defence Estates Agency. The 
consultant orchestrated a so-called business process re-engineering process before 
suggesting a specified organizational interface between strategic and operational 
functions. 
Negotiation factors also played a role in producing the eventual outcome. DOL 
executives thought that a slimmed-down directorate would segregate employment issues 
from daily attention-stealing crises arising from processing millions of pensions claims. 
However, since the NIA agreed, there was little negotiation between these two parties 
over this issue. Employee unions could have become a challenge, since many employees 
felt that they would forego status if they were to end up in the NDU rather than in the 
agency. NAV Interim’s leaders handled union opposition skilfully, though, and in the 
end there were relatively few tasks or responsibilities – or employees for that matter – 
IMPLEMENTATION OF  MERGER WORKING PAPER  11  -  2008  
 21 
that proved difficult to distribute between the two entities.9 NAV Interim did not have 
to negotiate with the ministry about the split. The ministry perceived the agency and the 
NDU as one entity despite the introduction of a purchaser-provider model. 
Employee scepticism combined with an awareness of political attention created a 
perception in NAV Interim that it was important to maintain the impression that the 
agency and the NDU were more integrated than autonomous. This symbolic factor 
partly explains why the NDU’s director ended up sitting on the agency’s board of 
directors. A further symbolic factor behind the chosen organizational structure was that 
by creating a slim NAV agency, NAV Interim’s leaders were able to signal to NAV 
employees and to politicians a dedication to efficiency and a focus on results. 
«[The split] was a wise move vis-à-vis politicians, and it was a wise move in 
relation to...what the reform is about – cut back on bureaucracy and focus on 
getting people into employment. A clever adaptation, I would say» (interview, civil 
servant). 
«It was a means to avoid discussions with [the NAV’s] county directors [about 
introducing efficiency measures] ... People wanted to show they had managed to 
increase efficiency at the central level» (interview, civil servant). 
Discussion 
The major participants in the merger implementation were the mother ministry, the 
Ministry of Labour, Mr Saglie, who lead NAV Interim, the transition organization, and 
representatives from the two, century-old incumbent welfare agencies. As employees of 
NAV Interim these people’s actions were clearly affected by their former professional 
identities and institutional histories. This partly explains why the case bears clear marks 
of negotiation between the two agencies. Instrumental policy learning and policy 
transfer also feature strongly, however, as do symbolic action directed towards 
stakeholders in the NAV’s environment. The narrative shows, however, that the specific 
dynamics, not least the extent to which the mother ministry exercised its authority, vary 
between the sub-events studied.  
F r am ing ,  a c t i v a t i on  and  o r gan i z i ng  
The first sub-event, framing of the transition process, was tightly controlled by the 
mother ministry – it bore clear marks of instrumental problem-solving. Organizational 
framing, developing guidelines and recruiting a leader all drew lessons from other, 
smaller, mergers in the central administrative apparatus. Drawing on past experience is 
important for successful mergers (Cartwright and Schoenberg 2006) and fairly novel in 
the conduct of mergers in the Norwegian civil service (Office of the Auditor General 
2005:3). Capacity problems were also a factor that was taken into account; it was 
thought that the ministry would be unable to take on the task of preparing a gigantic 
                                                 
9 A main strategy throughout the implementation process was to involve the unions in regular co-determination 
processes as well as more informal information meetings and workshops.  
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and controversial merger in-house. The transformative approach applied in this paper 
highlights, however, that the ministry’s problem-solving was to some extent marked by 
negotiation and environmental considerations. The recruitment of an «outsider» as 
leader was due partly to the existing welfare agencies’ fear of domination by the other, 
and partly to the ministry’s wish to communicate to the Storting and the local 
government sector that the NAV constituted a fresh start for the welfare bureaucracy. 
Furthermore, the ministry’s decision to frame the transition process by creating a 
temporary agency with directorate status – an organizational innovation in Norwegian 
central government – enabled the ministry to signal distance from politics and an 
emphasis on neutral expertise. 
The second sub-event, influencing participation and issue agendas in the transition 
process, was far less controlled by the ministry and the leaders of NAV Interim than the 
framing event was. Participation was broad and diverse, and only some of the diversity 
in participation, such as the inclusion of KS in the process, was intended by the political 
leadership. The issues discussed in NAV Interim were also diverse, and the ministry’ 
control efforts were tentatively limited to politically salient issues. Of the two involved 
agencies, the DOL was most aware of the importance of participation and most 
prepared to put forward specific substantive ideas. 
The third sub-event concerned the organization of the NAV at the central level. The 
main, comprehensive model for the internal structure of the NAV on the central level 
put forward by NAV Interim was quickly adopted by the ministerial leadership, thereby 
concluding that part of the process. However, the ministry was much less closely 
involved in deciding the internal organization of the central NAV agency and the NDU, 
the delivery unit at the central level. 
The  pe r spe c t i v e s  r e v i s i t ed  
Merger implementation is almost by its nature a combination of hierarchical control and 
negotiation. It is therefore not surprising that the transition process studied is 
characterized by these two features. As for negotiation, and in line with findings in 
previous studies, the merger has produced new conflict patterns and higher conflict 
levels because formerly autonomous bodies now found themselves having to work 
together inside a new agency (Egeberg 1989). The political decision to establish NAV 
Interim set up an arena for the two formerly autonomous agencies to fight it out. The 
political decision to bring in a «neutral» leader from outside the two incumbent agencies 
reflected the tense climate of negotiation and positioning, so it was imperative that the 
new director should be an independent actor from outside. Participation in NAV 
Interim and the ideas the participants brought were not very regulated, which created a 
lot of complexity. Nevertheless, the DOL, which was against the merger, worked harder 
than the NIA to influence the transition. This was reflected both in the representatives 
it selected, and in its more systematic pursuit of ideas. The process was made more 
complex by the political and administrative leadership’s conscious decision to include 
KS, the organization for local authorities, in order to enhance the legitimacy of the 
emerging local model. Whenever NAV Interim or groups within this organization 
proposed models for organizing NAV, this triggered a major negotiation process. 
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Because of the sheer number of groups and affected parties involved a lot of hearings 
and sounding-out sessions took place. The model for the central structure of NAV was 
based on complex principles, as was the purchaser-provider split that shaped the NAV’s 
relationship with the NDU. These were arrived at through a process of negotiation, 
although the DOL seems to have had the upper hand in this structuring. 
There are also cultural elements in the transition process. Establishing NAV Interim 
was in many respects an innovation, a new and different way of organizing a merger, but 
it could also be seen as culturally appropriate, because it gave the agencies more time to 
adapt to the new reality. It was not easy to break with nearly 100 years of history and 
path dependency, so the year NAV Interim existed gave the agencies some time to stop 
and think before embarking on the gradual establishment of the local welfare offices. 
The administrative leadership and the new director were very aware of this and worked 
to prepare the two agencies culturally for that challenge. The recruitment of the new 
director in itself also signalled the importance of cultural values like impartiality and 
competence. 
 There are also a number of symbols that provide insight into the transition process. 
Bringing in an outside person as director signalled the importance of experience and 
that the reform was a fresh start. The inclusion of outside experts in central roles in 
NAV Interim signalled impartiality and the importance of learning from the 
environment, particularly the private sector, with respect to management challenges. 
Bringing in KS symbolized inclusion and endowed the process with legitimacy. And 
furthermore, involving a wide range of employees in discussing a new structure signalled 
the value of broad participation and inclusion. 
If we sum up the process studied here, it is in many ways a hierarchically conducted 
one. But it is also a process featuring negotiations and one in which culture, traditions 
and awareness of the environment played a role. In line with a transformative approach 
there is a complex and dynamic logic of action.  
One dynamic relation is that between culture and negotiation. Existing research is 
inconclusive about exactly how cultural distance among incumbents affects the 
implementation of mergers; in a recent review of merger research, Stahl et al. (2005:04) 
encourage scholars to study how culture matters for mergers and under what conditions 
it does so. We argue, on the basis of this study, that negotiation between incumbents is a 
possible manifestation of cultural distance. We furthermore suggest that the chances 
that negotiation, i.e. cultural distance, will surface in merger implementations are high 
when the incumbents are institutionalized, when reform goals are ambiguous, and when 
framing is loose.  
A lengthy preparation and transition process may also increase the chances that 
negotiation and non-authorized agency influence affect the implementation of a merger. 
Research shows that a merger process is most easily top-down controlled for the first 
100 days after its launch (Stahl 2005:405). The NAV reform, by contrast, was very long, 
with years of transparent preparations followed by a year-long transition. There were 
authorative political and administrative controls over the process, but there remained 
windows of opportunity that actors other than the formal leaders of the process could 
and did use strategically to bring in their ideas, perspectives and traditions.  
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P r o ce s s  and  e f f e c t s  
The study shows that a merger, even after its launch, remains an ongoing, complex and 
dynamic process. Strategies, interests, cultural constraints and external forces present 
during merger preparation continue to affect the reform as it is gradually put into 
practice. In other words, what happens during the transition phase can also affect the 
further implementation and adaption of the reform (Cartwright and Schoenberg 2006). 
Existing research points to a number of possible effects of public sector mergers – 
effects we believe are conditioned by what goes on in the early stages of merger 
implementation.  
For example, Egeberg’s studies of mergers in the Norwegian central civil service 
(Egeberg 1989, 2003) suggest that mergers are a source of conflict, because they entail 
bringing together formerly autonomous units in a new unit. This study shows that while 
conflicts may be extensive during the transition phase, these need not paralyze the 
implementation of the merger. One interpretation of the case is that momentum was 
maintained during implementation, despite conflicts between the incumbents, because 
one of the incumbents, the DOL, hijacked the process. The chances that such 
«imperialism» will impede the success of the merger are generally reduced under the 
conditions present in the NAV case, namely that nobody, not even those who were 
«hijacked», needed to fear for their job, and because the dominant party was seen to 
have a more «enlightened» or goal-adapted culture (Stahl et al. 2005:404). 
Mergers may also reduce the new entity’s responsiveness to elected political 
superiors, because larger organizations are generally more resistant towards externally 
imposed control (Hood et al. 1985:66) and because elected politicians are generally less 
interested in the implementation than in the initiation of reforms. The NAV case, by 
contrast, exemplifies a high degree of follow-through (Hult 1987) by the ministry during 
the crucial transition phase; and this was not curbed by the decision to frame the 
transition using a temporary agency. 
Some say structural reforms result in new goals and priorities, while others say 
structural reforms are merely superficial: they change names and titles at the top, while 
at the next level down everything goes on as before (Hult 1987, Meyer 1977, Hood et al. 
1985). This study shows that a merger of NAV’s magnitude will easily be used as a 
window of opportunity by actors and groups who foster strong preferences for certain 
goals and structures. Substantial unforeseen changes may therefore occur during the 
transition period. It is perhaps not surprising that the NAV case should be characterized 
by such episodic, agent-driven change, since such change patterns are generally 
prevalent in highly institutionalized settings (Weick and Quinn 1999). 
Conclusion 
The question this paper set out to explore is how external control, internal conflict and 
cultural features condition the scope for instrumental problem-solving in the 
implementation of merger. The short answer to this question, using the experience 
gathered from the NAV case, is that the scope for instrumental problem-solving is 
conditioned by all three factors – most of all by internal conflicts, to some extent by 
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external control and to a lesser extent by cultural features. A more elaborate version of 
the answer will first and foremost challenge the assumption that the question seems to 
imply, namely, that there will be rational actors in such a process. The instrumental 
problem-solver identified here is Mr Saglie, who headed the process. The research 
question takes as a starting point the notion that his ability to act instrumentally to 
achieve the goal of establishing a well functioning NAV is constrained. Different actors 
have taken different approaches to enhance their strategic and rational problem-solving 
capacity. The DOL took a closed and cunning approach with a pre-set agenda. NIA 
took a more open approach, while the new director of the NAV apparently had little 
ambition or capacity to exercise strong steering or control. He appeared to expect an 
open, inclusive and broadminded process. The most strategic actors seem to be the 
ministry, which launched the innovative NAV Interim model, and the representatives 
from the DOL who managed to bring their old preferences/agenda back into the 
process. 
Our description of the process, which has focused on framing, on the activation of 
actors and issues, and on the organization of the NAV at the central level, identifies a 
relationship between the various factors that is much more complex than our research 
question implies. A number of factors interact. First and foremost, the actors taking part 
in the negotiations and their rationale for introducing issues are important, but so also 
are the culture and the tradition of the public services involved and the need for 
symbolic actions to satisfy the environment(s). Rather than a one-factor explanation of 
the implementation process we have revealed a compound process in which different 
forces coexist and balance instrumental design, cultural constraints, interests and 
external pressure (Olsen 2007, Christensen et al. 2007). There is a complex interplay 
between the different explanatory factors. One example of this is the relationship 
between instrumentality and culture. Those who led the implementation process tried to 
use cultural features actively to implement the reform. What we see accords with a 
transformative approach in which the scope for rational problem-solving is both 
constrained and enabled by internal interests, cultural constraints and external factors.  
A further insight to take away from this study is therefore that the transition phase, 
the phase between the decision to reform and the establishment of the new entity is a 
true transformative phase in the way that elements from several perspectives interact to 
form the new merged organization. One lesson is that this is an ongoing, complex and 
dynamic process in which strategies, interests, cultural constraints and external forces 
affect the content of the reform as it is gradually put into practice. It is for future 
research to decide whether the change dynamics found in the NAV case in its infancy 
become rarer as the organization becomes more mature.  
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of the Norwegian State 1947‒2003». December 2003. 
22‐2003  Ivar  Bleiklie, Haldor  Byrkjeflot  and  Katarina Östergren:  «Taking  Power  from Knowledge. A 
Theoretical Framework for the Study of Two Public Sector Reforms». December 2003. ATM. 
23‐2003  Per  Lægreid,  Ståle  Opedal  and  Inger  Marie  Stigen:  «The  Norwegian  Hospital  Reform  – 
Balancing Political Control and Enterprise Autonomy». December 2003. ATM. 
24‐2003  Håkon  Høst:  «Kompetansemåling  eller  voksenutdanning  i  pleie‐  og  omsorgsfagene? 
Underveisrapport fra en studie av pleie‐ og omsorgsutdanningene». Desember 2003. 
25‐2003  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Odd  Rune  Straume  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «Downstream  merger  with 
upstream market power». The Globalization Program. December 2003. 
26‐2003  Ingrid Drexel:  «Two Lectures: The Concept  of Competence  –  an  Instrument  of  Social  and 
Political Change». «Centrally Coordinated Decentralization – No Problem? Lessons from the 
Italian Case». December 2003. 
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1‐2002  Håkon  Høst:  «Lærlingeordning  eller  skolebasert  utdanning  i  pleie‐  og  omsorgsfagene?». 
April 2002. 
2‐2002  Jan‐Kåre  Breivik,  Hilde  Haualand  and  Per  Solvang:  «Rome  –  a  Temporary  Deaf  City! 
Deaflympics 2001». June 2002. 
3‐2002  Jan‐Kåre Breivik, Hilde Haualand og Per Solvang: «Roma – en midlertidig døv by! Deaflympics 
2001». Juni 2002. 
4‐2002  Christian Madsen: «Spiller det noen rolle? – om hverdagen på nye og gamle sykehjem». Juni 
2002. 
5‐2002  Elin Aasmundrud Mathiesen:  «Fritt  sykehusvalg. En  teoretisk analyse av konkurranse  i det 
norske sykehusmarkedet». Juni 2002. HEB. 
6‐2002  Tor Helge Holmås: «Keeping Nurses at Work: A Duration Analysis». June 2002. HEB. 
7‐2002  Ingvild Halland Ørnsrud:  «Mål‐  og  resultatstyring  gjennom  statlige  budsjettreformer».  Juli 
2002. 
8‐2002  Torstein Haaland: «Tid, situasjonisme og institusjonell utakt i systemer». Juli 2002. 
9‐2002  Kristin  Strømsnes:  «Samspillet  mellom  frivillig  organisering  og  demokrati:  Teoretiske 
argument og empirisk dokumentasjon». August 2002. 
10‐2002  Marjoleine Hooijkaas Wik:  «Mangfold  eller konformitet? Likheter og  forskjeller  innenfor og 
mellom fem statlige tilknytningsformer». August 2002. 
11‐2002  Knut Helland:«Den opprinnelige symbiosen mellom fotball og presse». September 2002. 
12‐2002  Nina Berven: «National Politics and Global Ideas? Welfare, Work and Legitimacy in Norway 
and the United States». September 2002. The Globalization Program. 
13‐2002  Johannes  Hjellbrekke:  «Globalisering  som  utfordring  til  samfunnsvitskapane».  September 
2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
14‐2002  Atle  Møen:  «Den  globale  produksjonen  av  symbol  og  kunnskap.  Verdsflukt  og 
verdsherredømme». September 2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
15‐2002  Tom Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Complex  Patterns  of  Interaction  and  Influence Among 
Political and Administrative Leaders». October 2002. 
16‐2002  Ivar Bleiklie: «Hierarchy and Specialization. On Institutional Integration of Higher Education 
Systems». Oktober 2002. 
17‐002  Per Lægreid, Runolfur Smari Steinthorsson and Baldur Thorhallsson: «Europeanization of Public 
Administration:  Effects  of  the  EU  on  the  Central  Administration  in  the  Nordic  States». 
November 2002. 
18‐2002  Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid: «Trust in Government — the Relative Importance of Service 
Satisfaction, Political Factors and Demography». November 2002. 
19‐2002  Marit  Tjomsland:  «Arbeidsinnvandringssituasjonen  i  Norge  etter  1975».  November  2002. 
Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
20‐2002  Augustín  José Menéndez  m.fl.:  «Taxing  Europe.  The  Case  for  European  Taxes  in  Federal 
Perspective». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
21‐2002  Fredrik  Andersson  and  Kai  A.  Konrad:  «Globalization  and  Risky  Human  Capital 
Investment».December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
22‐2002  Fredrik  Andersson  and  Kai  A.  Konrad:  «Human  Capital  Investment  and  Globalization  in 
Extortionary States». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
23‐2002  Anne Lise Fimreite, Yngve Flo og Jacob Aars: «Generalistkommune og oppgavedifferensiering. 
Tre innlegg». Desember 2002.  
24‐2002  Knut Grove: «Frå privat initiativ til kommunalt monopol. Lysverk, sporvegar og renovasjon i 
Bergen og Oslo 1850–1935». Desember 2002. 
25‐2002  Knut Grove: «Mellom ʹnon‐interventionʹ og ʹsamfundsvillieʹ. Statleg og kommunal regulering 
av økonomisk verksemd i Norge på 1800‐talet». Desember 2002. 
26‐2002  Dag  Arne  Christensen:  «Hovedtyper  av  valgordninger.  Proporsjonalitet  eller  politisk 
styring?». Desember 2002. 
27‐2002  Jan  Erik  Askildsen,  Badi  H.  Baltagi  and  Tor  Helge  Holmås:  «Will  Increased  Wages  Reduce 
Shortage of Nurses? A Panel Data Analysis f Nursesʹ Labour Supply». December 2002. HEB. 
28‐2002  Sturla Gjesdal, Peder R. Ringdal, Kjell Haug and  John Gunnar Mæland: «Medical Predictors of 
Disability Pension in Long‐Term Sickness Absence. December 2002. HEB. 
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29‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen  og  Jacob Aars:  «Teknologi  og demokrati. Med  norske  kommuner  på 
nett!». Desember 2002. 
30‐2002  Jacob  Aars:  «Byfolk  og  politikk.  Gjennomgang  av  data  fra  en  befolkningsundersøkelse  i 
Bergen, Oslo og Tromsø». Desember 2002. 
31‐2002  Hjørdis Grove: «Kommunaliseringsprosessen i Århus 1850–1940». Desember 2002. 
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